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Abstract
 
Women are disproportionately disadvantaged in 
access to finance in Africa. While supply-side 
detriments, such as high interest rates and collateral 
requirements, are well documented in the literature, 
little is understood about how demand-side factors 
contribute to the observed gender gap in access to 
finance. This paper provides the first empirical 
evidence on how women managers’ perception 
about their creditworthiness contributes to the large 
gender gap in Africa, particularly in the Northern 
region. One of the innovations of the paper is 
introducing a theoretical model using the credit 
market framework with imperfect and asymmetric 
information to explain what may drive loan 
applicants to self-select. We use firm-level data for 
47 African countries from the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey. We find that women 
entrepreneurs in Africa, in general, and in North 
Africa, in particular, are more likely to self-select 
themselves out of the credit market due to low 
perceived creditworthiness compared to their men 
counterparts. The results also suggest that the 
observed self-selection behavior is not a response 
mechanism to current discriminatory lending 
practices by the banks. The results are robust to 
different empirical specifications. The findings will 
inform policies towards greater financial inclusion 
of women in the region.  
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1. Introduction 
Access to finance helps start-ups grow into large enterprises and incumbent firms innovate and 
become competitive, creating job opportunities and contributing to economic growth. In most 
part of the developing world, however, low access to external finance has been a key constraint 
for entrepreneurs. Women entrepreneurs are particularly disadvantaged. For instance, 
according to the World Bank 2017 Global Findex Report, 56 percent of the adult population in 
the developing world which is still “unbankable”—without access to a bank account—are 
women, with a 9-percentage points gender gap. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 37 percent of women 
have a bank account compared to 48 percent of men, a gap that has widened over the past 
several years. The figures are even more drastic in the region of North Africa, where about 
two-third of the adult population remains “unbankable.”  At 18 percentage points, the North 
Africa region, to which this paper gives an emphasis, has the largest gender gap in the world 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018). Women are, therefore, disproportionately shunned from 
effectively participating in the market economy and, at a macro level, limiting countries from 
realizing their full growth and employment creation potentials (Aterido et al., 2013). 
Several studies have shown that supply-side factors play a major role in the exclusion 
of women from the formal credit market. When they do have access to finance, they face 
stringent loan configurations—higher interest rate or higher collateral—compared to men 
(Muravyev et al., 2009). There is also evidence that credit rationing through high interest rates 
disproportionately discourages women entrepreneurs from applying for a loan, while lack of a 
collateral reduces their access to loans than men (Aterido et al, 2013). Moreover, women are 
more likely to be excluded from the formal financial sector in countries where there are gender 
discriminatory laws and norms, lower participation of women in the labor market, and high 
level of state-ownership in the banking sector (Morsy and Youssef, 2017). This is particularly 
the case in most North Africa countries, where the gender gap, driven by socio-economic and 
cultural factors, is pervasive.  
While the impacts of supply-side factors are important in limiting women’s access to 
finance, women’s decision-making behavior also plays an important role in the observed 
gender gap. Aterido et al. (2013), for instance, found that the observed gender gap in South and 
East Africa could be attributed to lower levels of income and education of women compared 
to men. Similarly, an earlier study by Buvinic and Berger (1990) found that female 
entrepreneurs in Peru decide to not apply for loans due to complicated application procedures. 
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In addition, the literature establishes that women entrepreneurs could decide to not apply for 
loans—self-select themselves out of the credit market—due to factors such as low financial 
literacy, risk aversion, fear of failure, and so forth, even in the absence of discrimination by the 
banks.  
However, there is little evidence on how financial behavior of women in Africa 
contributes to the observed gender gap in access to finance. Do women entrepreneurs in Africa 
systematically self-select themselves out of the credit market compared to their men 
counterparts, and why? Understanding how women entrepreneurs make financial decisions in 
an environment where credit is highly rationed is important to design right policies and 
interventions.  
This paper fills the knowledge gap in the literature by examining whether women-
managed formal enterprises self-select themselves out of the formal credit market in Africa 
based on their perceived creditworthiness. We give emphasis to the North Africa region, where 
the gender gap is the highest in the world. In a parsimonious theoretical framework of credit 
market with imperfect information regime, we show that some applicants could self-exclude 
themselves out of the credit market based on their perceived creditworthiness. We use data 
from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (ES) project, taking advantage of the detailed survey 
information on why firms exclude themselves from the credit market and perceived 
creditworthiness. The survey covers 47 countries in Africa, out of which four—namely, Egypt, 
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia—are in North Africa. We use an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
method to address potential endogeneity, and control for various confounding factors that are 
potentially correlated with women manager and self-selection based on perceived 
creditworthiness.  
Our paper disentangles self-selection based on low perceived creditworthiness from 
self-selection due to actual or perceived discriminatory lending practice by banks. The 
literature, drawing mainly from developed countries, distinguishes between two types of 
discrimination in the credit market: statistical and taste-based discrimination (Phelps, 1972; 
Becker, 1971). On the one hand, statistical discrimination occurs when there is information 
asymmetry and lenders reject certain types of applicants based on some observed 
characteristics. This is because, lenders use a set of loan applicants’ characteristics, for 
instance, age, gender and race/ethnic group, to predict their creditworthiness and make 
decisions to accept or reject certain group of applicants. Taste-based discrimination, on the 
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other hand, emanates from an animus or a prejudice towards one group of applicants based on 
race, gender, religion and other personal characteristics (Becker, 1971). This type of 
discrimination carries a higher cost to the decision-maker.  
Regardless of the type of discrimination, women loan applicants form their beliefs and 
respond in different ways. In the context of developed countries, for instance, Wellner (2008) 
found that minority applicants in the U.S. are disproportionately discouraged from applying 
for credit. These applicants face higher denial rates, higher mortgage interest rates, and higher 
payment-to-debt ratios. Similarly, in the U.S. mortgage-market context, Longhofer and Peters 
(2005) shows the existence of a self-selection behavior among minorities in response to taste-
based discrimination by banks.  
In a developing-country context, Agier and Szafarz (2013) found evidence of a glass-
ceiling effect against women among large project applicants in a large Brazilian microfinance 
institution, although they did not detect a discriminatory lending practice. Women can also 
resort to informal finance as a response mechanism to discrimination. Based on a survey of 
small-size enterprises in three African countries—Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zambia, Richardson 
et al. (2004) found that women entrepreneurs were more likely to rely on their own or informal 
financing mechanisms to finance their businesses than men do. While these studies are 
informative about women entrepreneurs’ financial behavior, there is a huge gap in our 
understanding of women self-selective behavior in the context of Africa.  
Our paper provides fresh evidence on how perception about creditworthiness, even in 
the absence of discriminatory lending practices, contributes to the large gender gap in Africa, 
particularly in the Northern region. The findings of our paper inform policies towards greater 
financial inclusion of women in the region.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in our 
analysis and presents some descriptive statistics; section 3 introduces our conceptual 
framework of self-selection in the credit market; section 4 discusses the empirical strategies 
employed; section 5 presents the key findings of the paper; and section 6 concludes by 
discussing the findings’ implications for policy and directions for future research. 
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2. Data and Descriptive Analysis 
This study is based on data from the standardized ES, a firm-level survey jointly conducted by 
the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European 
Investment Bank. We use the harmonized dataset that covers more than 135,000 firms in 189 
countries in the geographic regions of the world, conducted over a ten-year period between 
2006 and 2016. The survey covers more than 37,000 firms in 47 countries African countries, 
with more than 6,000 firms in four North African countries (Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and 
Tunisia).1  
The survey covers firms in manufacturing and services sectors that correspond to ISIC 
codes of 15-37, 45, 50-52, 55, 60-64, and 72 (ISIC Rev.3.1). The distribution between sectors 
is determined according to the sectors’ relative contribution to GDP in each country. Formal 
(registered) firms with more than five employees are included in the survey. Services sector 
activities include construction, retail, wholesale, hotels, restaurants, transport, storage, 
communications and information technology. Firms with 100 percent government ownership 
are not eligible for the survey. The sampling methodology is stratified random sampling.  
We use direct survey information to construct our key dependent variable, which is 
self-selection out of the credit market. The ES directly asks respondents on whether they 
applied for a new loan or a line of credit in the last fiscal year. If the response is “No”, then 
respondents are asked to provide the major reason for why they did not apply. The reasons are: 
1) “Don’t know” 2) “No need for a loan”; 3) “Complex application procedures”; 4) “Interest 
rates were not favorable”; 5) “Collateral requirements are too high”; 6) “Insufficient size of 
loan and maturity”; 7) “Did not think it would be approved”; and 8) “Other reasons.” We 
considered a respondent to self-select herself/himself out of the credit market, if her/his main 
reason for not applying is “Did not think it would be approved.” We construct an additional 
dependent variable to reflect whether women entrepreneurs face higher rejection rate on their 
applications for loans or lines of credit based on respondents’ answers to a question about the 
outcome of the most recent application for loan/line of credit (accepted or rejected). 
                                                 
1
 A comprehensive description of the data and survey methodology is provided online at: 
 www.enterprisesurveys.org. 
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Our explanatory variable of interest is the gender of the entrepreneur, i.e., firm’s top 
manager.2  Table 1 shows the reasons for “not applying” for new loans or new lines of credit 
by gender and region. For firms in need of a loan, the top two reasons for not applying reported 
by female managers in Africa are “interest rates were not favorable” and “application 
procedures were complex.” The top two reasons for female-managed firms in the North Africa 
region are “application procedures were complex” and they “did not think it would be 
approved,” revealing important differences. 
Table 1: Reasons for not Applying for New Loans/Lines of Credit in the Last Fiscal Year  
(by Gender of Top Manager) 
Reason  Africa  North Africa 
  Male Female Pooled  Male Female Pooled 
No need for a loan*   67.6% 55.3% 62.8%  75.9% 66.6% 75.3% 
Application procedures were complex  9.2% 10.9% 10.4%  8.6% 11.0% 8.8% 
Interest rates were not favorable  8.6% 11.5% 10.9%  6.4% 6.2% 6.4% 
Collateral requirements were too high  5.2% 8.3% 5.8%  2.0% 3.2% 2.1% 
Size of loan and maturity were insufficient  1.1% 1.1% 1.2%  0.7% 0.4% 0.7% 
Did not think it would be approved (Low 
Perceived Creditworthiness) 
 3.5% 6.5% 4.1%  3.2% 9.3% 3.6% 
Other reasons  4.7% 6.4% 4.7%  3.1% 3.2% 3.1% 
         
Observations    37,699    6,097 
* Establishment had sufficient capital. Survey weighted data are used (Stata’s svy prefix). 
 
While 6.5 percent of female-managed firms in Africa reported that they did not apply 
for new loans or credit line because they perceived that their application would not be 
approved, only 3.5 percent of male-managed firms reported that as a main reason. The 
difference is much larger for respondents in North Africa, with 9.3 percent of female-managed 
firms reporting that they did not apply because they “did not think their application would be 
approved,” only 3.2 percent of male-managed firms reported that as the main reason for not 
applying. This yields a gender gap of over 6 percent in North Africa vis-à-vis 3 percent for the 
entire continent.  
The observed gender gap in self-selection out of the credit market could be explained 
by two main reasons: either female-managed firms have a lower probability of getting their 
                                                 
2
 The descriptive statistics and estimations’ results by the gender of the firm’s owner are provided in Appendix 
A. 
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application approved because they have lower creditworthiness, and/or they perceive 
themselves of lower creditworthiness than they are.3 
Our formal econometric analysis controls for sales per worker that reflects the 
productivity of the firm or the firm’s profitability in the broad sense4, sector of operation, firm 
size, locality size, whether the firm is located in the official capital city, legal status of the firm, 
share of foreign ownership, firm age, number of employees, top manager’s years of experience, 
whether the firm holds an internationally-recognized quality certification, share of direct 
exports in total sales, and whether the firm’s financial statements were checked and certified 
by an external auditor. Our set of control variables also includes year and country dummies. 
Moreover, we use the proportion of full-time female employees in the total workforce as an 
instrument for “female manager”. We discuss more about the instrument in the empirical 
methods’ section.  
The differences in firms’ characteristics by gender of top manager are reported in Table 
2. On average, both in Africa and North Africa, female-managed firms are more concentrated 
in the services’ sector, are of smaller size, are more likely to be located in the official capital 
city, have lower foreign ownership’s share, are younger, have fewer number of employees, 
have lower top manager’s experience years, and are less likely to hold an internationally-
recognized quality certification, compared to male-managed firms. Such differences can have 
serious implications for access to finance. For instance, younger and smaller firms are typically 
less favored by bankers (Robb, 2013). Also, being in the main capital city can be associated 
with a negative effect as firms face fiercer competition and thus, need to meet higher 
requirements in order to be successful in their application for credit. On the contrary, being a 
big exporter and having a manager with more years of experience can make the firm more 
confident to apply for credit. 
We also observe that the variation by gender in some of the key firms’ characteristics, 
such as firm’s size and age, is lower in the North Africa region compared to the whole 
continent, suggesting that systematic reasons for self-selection are less significant in the region. 
If this is the case, and the estimation results provided later exhibit a stronger evidence of self-
                                                 
3
 If the latter is the case, and female managers are, on average, less overconfident and more risk averse than male 
managers (Nekby et al., 2007), then the pool of female applicants is likely to consist of women managers whose 
businesses have superior characteristics of performance and creditworthiness (and thus, more likely to get their 
application approved). This will, in turn, result in a higher share of female successful applicants.  
4
 This is a key indicator used by financial institutions or banks to assess the creditworthiness of a firm. 
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selection in North Africa, we may conclude that women entrepreneurs’ self-selection behavior 
in this region is more sensitive to their perceptions. In this regard, it is imperative to note that 
no differences are observed in firm true creditworthiness (proxied by sales per worker) between 
female- and male-managed firms in both Africa and North Africa. 
Table 2: Differences in Baseline Firm Characteristics  
(by Gender of Top Manager) 
Characteristic  Africa  North Africa 
  Male Female Pooled  Male Female Pooled 
Sector         
Manufacturing  48.6% 39.3% 47.5%  64.4% 60.5% 64.2% 
Services  51.4% 60.7% 52.5%  35.6% 39.5% 35.8% 
Firm Size         
Small  53.0% 68.9% 54.9%  40.6% 46.3% 40.9% 
Medium  31.2% 23.3% 30.2%  34.8% 34.3% 34.8% 
Large  15.8% 7.8% 14.8%  24.6% 19.4% 24.3% 
Locality Size         
Main Business City*  19.0% 16.2% 18.7%  34.0% 40.1% 34.3% 
Over 1 million  40.7% 43.2% 41.0%  17.3% 14.5% 17.1% 
250,000 - 1 million  25.7% 27.6% 25.9%  20.6% 18.5% 20.5% 
50,000 - 250,000  10.4% 10.2% 10.4%  15.8% 15.4% 15.8% 
Less than 50,000  4.2% 2.8% 4.1%  12.3% 11.4% 12.2% 
Official Capital City Y:1  41.5% 45.0% 41.9%  26.2% 29.3% 26.3% 
Firm Legal Status         
Shareholding Company with Shares Traded 
in the Stock Market 
 6.5% 4.1% 6.2%  7.9% 7.8% 7.9% 
Shareholding Company with Non-
Traded/Privately-Traded Shares 
 17.4% 12.9% 16.9%  29.0% 26.7% 28.9% 
Sole Proprietorship   49.6% 57.2% 50.5%  32.3% 32.0% 32.2% 
Partnership  12.1% 10.1% 11.8%  19.3% 18.3% 19.3% 
Limited partnership  12.2% 13.7% 12.4%  10.3% 13.0% 10.5% 
Other  2.3% 2.0% 2.3%  1.3% 2.2% 1.3% 
Share Foreign Ownership  11.774 9.017 11.594  6.470 5.900 6.492 
Firm Age  17.747 15.281 15.875  21.098 20.718 20.645 
Number of Employees  82.262 39.027 65.506  138.991 102.991 132.212 
Top Manager Experience Years  16.994 13.677 15.197  22.001 18.707 21.425 
Quality Certification Y:1  17.5% 12.3% 16.9%  24.1% 19.5% 23.9% 
Log Sales Per Worker  10.369 10.212 10.490  10.900 10.835 10.887 
Direct Exports Share of Sales  5.873 4.612 4.823  9.204 9.658 8.999 
External Audit Y:1  56.9% 49.7% 56.0%  77.5% 77.8% 77.5% 
         
Observations    37,699    6,097 
For continuous variables (share foreign ownership, firm age, number of employees, top manager experience years, ln sales per worker and 
direct exports share of sales), we report means instead of proportions. 
*Main business cities are defined as cities with “major economic activity”.  
3. Conceptual Framework 
Imperfect and asymmetric information in the credit market gives rise to incentive problems in 
the form of adverse selection and moral hazard. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) shows that banks 
reject some borrowers due to information asymmetry, leading to credit rationing even in a 
perfectly competitive credit market. This is because, at higher levels of interest rate and 
collateral requirements, only the risky firms apply giving rise to negative adverse selection. In 
parallel, a higher interest rate incentivizes borrowers to choose riskier projects with higher 
returns, increasing the risk of bankruptcy and moral hazard. Even with risk-neutral borrowers, 
as shown in Wette (1983), a higher collateral requirement can push safe projects out of the 
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market, decreasing banks’ profits. Bester (1985), however, shows that if banks compete on 
collateral requirements and use the interest rate to screen borrowers’ riskiness, then no credit 
rationing will occur in equilibrium as using different contracts acts as a self-selection 
mechanism. High-creditworthy borrowers tend to accept loan contract configurations that have 
higher collateral requirements for a certain reduction in the interest rate than low-creditworthy 
borrowers. Building on Bester (1985), Han et al. (2009) further shows that high-creditworthy 
borrowers can offer collateral as a signal to lenders to obtain lower interest rate than low-
creditworthy investors with riskier and low-return projects.5  
Within the standard credit market model, we introduce loan applicants’ perception 
toward their creditworthiness. Following the literature (such as Bester, 1985; Han et al., 2009; 
Longhofer and Peters, 1999), our key simplifying assumptions are: (1) both banks and 
borrowers are risk neutral, and risk-free interest rate is normalized to zero; (2) banks’ loan 
offers depend on the observed signals that the loan applicants send; (3) banks can objectively 
predict applicants’ creditworthiness based on the signals banks receive; and (4) borrowers have 
imperfect information about their true creditworthiness.   
Now, consider a project that succeeds with probability 𝑝 and fails with probability 1 −𝑝. The probability of success depends on the borrowers’ quality (or type), which is also equal 
to its creditworthiness . When the project succeeds, the borrower/entrepreneur earns a return 
of 𝑅 = (1 + ?̃?)𝐼, otherwise zero, where ?̃? is the rate of return on the project and 𝐼 is the 
investment amount. Given the borrower’s risk type , the expected return from the investment 
is given by 𝑅 =  (1 + ?̃?)𝐼. If the project succeeds, the expected benefit from the loan is the 
sum of initial wealth (denoted by 𝑊) that is presented as a collateral and the return of the 
project. If the project fails, the borrower must transfer the collateral to the bank. Then, for a 
borrower of risk type , the expected net benefit of undertaking the project using a loan offered 
under contract 𝛾𝜃 is given by 𝐸𝛱(𝛾𝜃) =  [𝑊 + (1 + ?̃?)𝐼 − (1 + 𝑟)𝐼] + (1 − )[𝑊 − 𝐶]                 = 𝑊 + (?̃? − 𝑟) 𝐼 + (1 − )𝐶                                                                                            (1) 
                                                 
5
 This sorting behavior is referred to as ‘sorting-by-private-information’ in which collateral is used by applicants 
as a signal to banks. 
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where 𝑟 is the interest rate charged by the bank. Based on the signals it receives from the loan 
applicant and the applicants’ pool, the bank forms its posterior belief distribution about the 
types of loan applicants. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the bank receives 
applications from two groups of loan applicants: high-creditworthy applicants 𝐻 with 
probability  and low-creditworthy type 𝐿 with probability 1 − 𝛼. Then, the bank offers 
contracts 𝛾𝐻 = {𝑟𝐻, 𝐶𝐻} to high-creditworthy applicants and 𝛾𝐿 = {𝑟𝐿 , 𝐶𝐿} to low-creditworthy 
applicants. This set of loan contracts should maximize the bank’s expected profit and serve as 
a self-selection mechanism, satisfying the individual rationality (IR) and incentive 
compatibility (IC) conditions. The IR condition stipulates that the entrepreneur applies for the 
loan if and only if the expected benefit of undertaking the project through bank financing is 
greater than the initial wealth:  𝐸𝛱(𝛾𝑖) = 𝑊 + (?̃?𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖)𝜃𝑖 𝐼 + (1 − 𝜃𝑖)𝐶 > 𝑊,     𝑖 = {𝐿, 𝐻}                                                      (2) 
The IC condition implies that a borrower of type 𝑖 accepts only a loan contract designed for 
her/him, i.e.,  𝐸𝛱𝐻(𝛾𝐻) > 𝐸𝛱𝐻(𝛾𝐿) , and 𝐸𝛱𝐿(𝛾𝐿) > 𝐸𝛱𝐿(𝛾𝐻). 
Under imperfect information, the borrower does not have full information about her/his 
true risk type 𝜃𝑖 and about the set of information that the bank has on the pool of applicants. 
Instead, the applicant uses her/his self-assessed (perceived) creditworthiness ?̃? to make the 
decision on whether to apply for a loan or not. We denote the borrower’s perceived 
creditworthiness by ?̃?𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜁𝑖, where 𝜁𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜁2) is the perception bias towards her/his 
creditworthiness. Then, the potential borrower applies for a loan if and only if:  𝐸𝛱(?̃?𝑖) = 𝑊 + (?̃?𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖)?̃?𝑖  𝐼 + (1 − ?̃?𝑖)𝐶 > 𝑊 => (?̃?𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖)?̃?𝑖 𝐼 + (1 − ?̃?𝑖)𝐶 > 0              (3)                 
Therefore, we can write the probability of loan application as 
𝑃𝑟(𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖 = 1| . ) = 𝑃 𝑟 [(?̃?𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖)𝜃𝑖  𝐼 + (1 − 𝜃𝑖)𝐶𝐶 − (?̃?𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖) 𝐼 > 𝜁𝑖]                                                     (4. 𝑎) 
                                    = 𝑃𝑟 [ 11−(?̃?𝑖−𝑟𝑖) 𝐼𝐶 + 𝜃𝑖 > 𝜁𝑖]                                                                        (4. 𝑏)   
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The first part of equation (4.b), i.e., 11−(?̃?𝑖−𝑟𝑖) 𝐼𝐶, is the profitability of the project. The second 
part (i.e., 𝜃𝑖) is the objective creditworthiness, which is assumed to correspond with the bank’s 
unbiased predicted creditworthiness based on the applicants’ profiles and received signals.   
The implications are straightforward with three empirically testable predictions: 1) If 𝜁𝑖 =0, the bank’s unbiased prediction and the applicant’s perceived creditworthiness coincide. In 
this case, the model is similar to the standard credit market model in the literature in that the 
borrower’s decision to apply for the loan is based on the objective prediction of her/his 
creditworthiness and expected profit. 2) If the applicant’s perceived creditworthiness is lower 
than her/his true creditworthiness (𝜁𝑖 < 0), she/he decides to not apply even if her/his predicted 
creditworthiness is higher and the loan application has higher likelihood of being accepted by 
the bank. 3) If the applicant’s perceived creditworthiness is higher than her/his predicted 
creditworthiness (𝜁𝑖 > 0), then the entrepreneur applies for a loan even if her/his predicted 
creditworthiness is lower and the loan application has lower likelihood of being accepted by 
the bank.  
4. Empirical Methods 
4.1. Baseline Specification  
We use a multinomial logistic regression to model the various reasons for “not applying” to 
new bank loans or lines of credit. In the specification, our primary interest is to examine 
whether women entrepreneurs tend to self-select out of the credit market because they did not 
think their applications for loans/lines of credit would be approved. The multinomial 
specification allows us to jointly estimate all the reasons for “not applying” while accounting 
for potential correlation between the different reasons. As described in the data section above, 
we consider an entrepreneur to self-select out of the credit market on the bases of low perceived 
creditworthiness, if she/he did not apply for a loan or a line of credit because she/he “did not 
think it would be approved.” Accordingly, we write the multinomial model as:              𝑃𝑟(𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 𝑗|𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 0) = 𝛬(𝛼𝑗 + 𝜑𝑗𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝑍𝑖),          (5) 
where 𝛬(∙) is a multinomial log function. 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑡𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖 is a categorical variable taking 
values 𝑗 = 1, if the reason was “there was no need for loan”; 𝑗 = 2, if the reason was “the 
application procedures were complex”; 𝑗 = 3,  if the reason was “the loan/credit terms were 
unfavorable (interest rates were not favorable, collateral requirements were too high, or size 
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of loan and maturity were insufficient)”; 𝑗 = 4, if the reason was “did not think its application 
would be approved” (our proxy of self-selection); and 𝑗 = 5, if the response was “other 
reasons”. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 is our explanatory variable of interest and is a dummy variable taking a 
value of 1, if the firm is female-managed, and 0, otherwise. 𝑍𝑖 is a vector of control variables 
including proxies for firm’s creditworthiness, a set of firm characteristics, and country and year 
dummies, 𝛼𝑗, 𝜑𝑗 and 𝛽𝑗 are vectors of coefficients to be estimated.  
If 𝜑𝑗 is statistically significant, we infer that there is gender-based self-selection 
conditional on all other factors. We run the model in equation (5) separately for Africa and for 
the subsample of the North Africa region.  
One of the challenges is, we do not have enough information on whether respondents 
self-select in response to discriminatory lending practices by banks and/or because they 
perceive themselves as low creditworthy. To rule out the possibility that women entrepreneurs 
self-select out of the credit market in response to discriminatory lending practices, we need to 
empirically establish that there is no gender-based differences in loan rejection rates. Therefore, 
we estimate the probability of rejection on a recent loan using a logit model as                        𝑃𝑟(𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 = 1|𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 1) = 𝛬(𝛼 + 𝛾𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝜎𝑊𝑖),                    (6) 
where 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 indicates if the application for a new loan or a line of credit was rejected,  𝑊𝑖 is a vector of control variables, and 𝛾 is our coefficient of interest, capturing gender 
differential in the probability of loan application rejection. All other variables are as defined 
before. 
If we find no statistically significant evidence of discrimination by banks, it is plausible 
to infer that self-selection by women entrepreneurs is not driven by discriminatory lending 
practices by banks, but rather by their perceived creditworthiness. 
4.2. Instrumental Variable Approach 
A potential challenge for our model specification is endogeneity, as   could be biased due to 
omitted variable/s problem. We suspect that other observed and unobserved factors could 
systematically affect women entrepreneurship and self-selection behavior in the credit market. 
For instance, in addition to perception towards their creditworthiness, women and men could 
have systematic differences, say on the levels of risk aversion, which could be correlated with 
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women entrepreneurship and self-selection out of the credit market. As a result, the estimated 
coefficient could be biased picking up the effects of other observed and unobserved factors that 
differ by gender. Depending on the direction of correlation, the bias could be positive or 
negative.   
To correct for such bias, we estimate our model using an IV method. We use the 
proportion of full-time female employees in the firm as an instrument for “female manager.” 
The instrument is both plausible with a strong underlying economic rationale and passes 
important statistical tests. In terms of economic rationale, organizational theory establishes that 
there is a positive gender spillover between bosses and lower-rank employees. As described in 
Kinze and Mileler (2017), there are two channels for the positive correlation between women 
managers and the proportion of female workers in the firm. First, higher-ranking women serve 
as mentors, role models, and advocates for their lower-ranking coworkers. Second, the 
decisions to promote or hire are often based on taste-based or statistical discrimination of 
current leaders. 
Moreover, female-management is correlated with higher proportion of women 
employees in the firm by weakening the associations of formal employment with masculinity. 
Although the spillover could be negative, there is an overwhelming evidence that the 
relationship between female management and the proportion of female employment is positive 
(Maida and Webber, 2019). The proportion of female employees, however, is normally 
orthogonal and exogenous to self-selection out of the credit market. Hence, the proportion of 
female workers in the firm is a plausible IV for “female manager.”    
In addition, our checks show that the instrument meets the criteria of strong relevance 
and exogeneity.6 The proportion of female employees is significantly and positively correlated 
with the “female manager” variable. The first-stage F-statistic for the significance of the 
instrument further supports its strong relevance from a statistical standpoint. Besides, the 
overidentifying restrictions’ tests provide evidence of the instrument’s exogeneity. Thus, we 
estimate an IV probit model focusing on our dependent variable of interest: “self-selection.”  
                                                 
6
 For an IV approach to be a reasonable identification strategy, any instrumental variable Z is required to be 
correlated with the likelihood of becoming a manager being a woman (assumption 1), while it should not be 
correlated with neither the dependent variable “self-selection” nor the error term “unobservables” (assumption 2). 
If either of these two identification assumptions is violated, employing Z as an instrument is not a viable approach. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
5.1. Baseline Estimates of Self-Selection  
The estimated results of our baseline specification are reported in Tables 3 and 4 for the whole 
sample of Africa and the North Africa region, respectively. As shown in Table 3, compared to 
men, women managers in Africa are significantly more likely to not apply for new loans or 
new lines of credit because they “did not think it would be approved.” Specifically, having a 
female rather than a male manager is significantly associated with a 1.202 increase in the 
relative log odds of reporting self-selection as the reason for not applying versus the “no need 
for a loan” reason. By exponentiating the coefficient, we find that the relative probability of 
reporting self-selection as the reason for not applying rather than “no need for a loan” for 
female managers is more than triple the corresponding relative probability for male managers 
with the same firm characteristics.7 
The difference between male and female managers’ self-selection behavior is stronger 
for firms in North Africa. Table 3 shows that female managers have 1.583 higher relative log 
odds of selecting themselves out of the credit market. In other words, the relative probability 
of reporting self-selection as the reason for not applying rather than the “no need for a loan” 
reason for female managers in North Africa is more than four times the corresponding relative 
probability for male managers with the same firm characteristics. Interestingly, self-selection 
is the only reason for which we find significant gender differences between female- and male-
managed firms both in Africa and North Africa. We find no statistically significant differences 
between female- and male-managed firms for all the other reported reasons: “complexity of 
application procedures,” “unfavorable loan/credit terms,” and “other reasons.” 
There is also a significant negative relationship between log sales per worker, which is 
a good proxy for profitability and true creditworthiness of firms, and self-selection out of the 
credit market. A one-unit increase in log sales per worker, denoting an increase in the true 
creditworthiness of the firm, is associated with an 0.128 decrease in the relative log odds of 
                                                 
7
 The coefficients obtained from the logistic regression are the raw regression coefficients. The coefficient of the 
variable “Female Top Manager” is the log of odds ratio between the female-managers group and the male-
managers group. So, we obtain the odds ratio, i.e., the odds for female managers versus male managers for a 
specific outcome (reason for not applying), by exponentiating the reported regression coefficient of the variable 
“Female Top Manager.” 
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reporting self-selection as the reason for not applying versus the “no need for a loan” reason 
(Table 3).  This result affirms that low perception of creditworthiness is also determined by 
firm’s performance.  
Similarly, women managers in North Africa are more likely to self-select due to their 
lower perception of the creditworthiness of their firms, and not by their true creditworthiness 
(Table 4). We should expect high-productivity firms to have high perceived creditworthiness 
and low self-selection. To our surprise, however, we find no statistically significant 
relationship between productivity and perceived creditworthiness as a reason for firms in North 
Africa to self-select. This implies that managers’ perceived creditworthiness in the North 
Africa region can, in fact, be vastly different from the true creditworthiness. 
Table 3: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Reasons for Self-Selection 
(by Gender of Manager in Africa) 
Outcome Variable: What is the Main Reason for not 
Applying for New Loans / New Lines of Credit? 
Reason 
(1) 
Complex 
Application 
(2) 
Unfavorable   
Terms 
(3) 
Low 
Perception  
(4) 
Other Reasons 
Female Top Manager Y:1 N:0 0.424 0.348 1.202*** 0.000 
 (0.313) (0.233) (0.432) (0.305) 
Sector (Ref: Manufacturing)     
Services -0.261 -0.300* -0.064 -0.160 
 (0.202) (0.154) (0.307) (0.263) 
Firm Size (Ref: Small)     
Medium -0.412* -0.451** 0.067 -0.178 
 (0.227) (0.186) (0.331) (0.323) 
Large -0.421 -1.215*** -0.625* -0.245 
 (0.350) (0.253) (0.354) (0.407) 
Locality Size (Ref: Main Business City)     
Over 1 million -0.393 0.391 0.917** 1.171** 
 (0.333) (0.273) (0.439) (0.505) 
250,000 - 1 million -0.001 0.682** 0.894** 1.154** 
 (0.391) (0.315) (0.428) (0.480) 
50,000 - 250,000 0.066 0.932*** 2.126*** 1.267** 
 (0.424) (0.323) (0.531) (0.516) 
Less than 50,000 0.087 0.995*** 0.448 0.190 
 (0.474) (0.354) (0.482) (0.644) 
Official Capital City Y:1 N:0 -0.401 0.211 0.088 -0.169 
 (0.298) (0.191) (0.289) (0.297) 
Firm Legal Status (Ref: Shareholding Company with 
Shares Traded in the Stock Market) 
    
Shareholding Company with Non-
Traded/Privately-Traded Shares 
-0.750 0.047 -0.113 -1.359** 
 (0.463) (0.395) (0.946) (0.549) 
Sole Proprietorship  -0.211 0.098 -0.026 -0.091 
 (0.427) (0.337) (0.861) (0.475) 
Partnership -0.030 0.518 -0.279 -0.853* 
 (0.443) (0.367) (0.948) (0.514) 
Limited partnership 0.212 0.322 0.847 -0.677 
 (0.465) (0.366) (0.936) (0.574) 
Other -1.214 -1.509** 1.627 -1.343* 
 (0.777) (0.673) (1.347) (0.791) 
Share Foreign Ownership -0.007* 0.004 0.001 -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Firm Age -0.002 -0.001 -0.062*** -0.040*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.013) 
Number of Employees 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Top Manager Experience Years -0.009 0.005 0.006 0.019* 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) 
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Quality Certification Y:1 N:0 -0.070 -0.106 -1.300*** -0.474 
 (0.341) (0.213) (0.382) (0.355) 
Sales Per Worker -0.035 -0.080 -0.128* 0.079 
 (0.057) (0.049) (0.072) (0.091) 
Direct Exports Share of Sales -0.005 -0.010* -0.013** -0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
External Audit Y:1 N:0 -0.435** -0.158 0.743** 0.643** 
 (0.205) (0.152) (0.319) (0.252) 
Constant -1.264 0.288 -4.176*** -2.129* 
 (0.915) (0.798) (1.570) (1.284) 
     
Observations 11,603 11,603 11,603 11,603 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
coefficients are estimated using survey weighted data (Stata’s svy prefix). Country dummies are included in all estimations. Reference 
category: No need for a loan. 
 
Table 4: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Reasons for Self-Selection  
(by Gender of Manager in North Africa) 
Outcome Variable: What is the Main Reason for not 
Applying for New Loans / New Lines of Credit? 
Reason 
(1) 
Complex 
Application 
(2) 
Unfavorable   
Terms 
(3) 
Low 
Perception 
(4) 
Other Reasons 
Female Top Manager Y:1 N:0 0.619 0.659 1.583*** -0.761 
 (0.414) (0.433) (0.550) (0.883) 
Sector (Ref: Manufacturing)     
Services -0.190 -0.356 -0.009 -0.092 
 (0.247) (0.228) (0.375) (0.403) 
Firm Size (Ref: Small)     
Medium -0.511* -0.284 0.073 -0.394 
 (0.277) (0.258) (0.411) (0.510) 
Large -0.676 -1.297*** -0.336 0.248 
 (0.413) (0.430) (0.505) (0.723) 
Locality Size (Ref: Main Business City)     
Over 1 million -0.685* 0.482 1.146* 2.185** 
 (0.411) (0.459) (0.689) (1.015) 
250,000 - 1 million -0.107 0.879** 0.975 2.072** 
 (0.415) (0.441) (0.671) (0.988) 
50,000 - 250,000 0.036 1.220*** 2.578*** 2.380** 
 (0.457) (0.441) (0.690) (1.017) 
Less than 50,000 -0.013 1.192** 0.799 1.150 
 (0.495) (0.464) (0.686) (1.108) 
Official Capital City Y:1 N:0 -0.630* 0.382 0.561 1.203 
 (0.380) (0.407) (0.624) (1.034) 
Firm Legal Status (Ref: Shareholding Company with 
Shares Traded in the Stock Market) 
    
Shareholding Company with Non-
Traded/Privately-Traded Shares 
-0.869 0.173 -0.470 -2.577*** 
 (0.540) (0.561) (1.358) (0.848) 
Sole Proprietorship  -0.174 0.059 -0.322 -0.601 
 (0.490) (0.504) (1.255) (0.618) 
Partnership -0.010 0.632 -0.568 -1.759** 
 (0.500) (0.506) (1.353) (0.685) 
Limited partnership 0.141 0.274 0.515 -1.428* 
 (0.545) (0.551) (1.321) (0.787) 
Other -2.759** -0.348 -14.981*** -2.114* 
 (1.355) (0.933) (1.378) (1.131) 
Share Foreign Ownership -0.009 0.007 0.004 -0.017** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Firm Age -0.002 0.003 -0.094*** -0.076*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.027) (0.028) 
Number of Employees 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Top Manager Experience Years -0.007 0.008 0.011 0.031* 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) 
Quality Certification Y:1 N:0 0.057 -0.311 -1.567*** -0.573 
 (0.429) (0.349) (0.521) (0.710) 
Sales Per Worker -0.015 0.020 -0.105 0.074 
 (0.081) (0.095) (0.112) (0.206) 
Direct Exports Share of Sales -0.007 -0.006 -0.017** -0.019** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
External Audit Y:1 N:0 -0.409* -0.225 1.097** 1.048** 
17 
 
 (0.241) (0.229) (0.500) (0.436) 
Country (Ref: Egypt)     
Mauritania 0.357 1.786*** 0.541 0.859 
 (0.813) (0.634) (1.234) (1.196) 
Morocco -1.096** -0.480 -0.693 -0.388 
 (0.500) (0.398) (0.908) (0.525) 
Tunisia 0.819** 0.670* 1.702*** 0.944 
 (0.386) (0.367) (0.565) (0.708) 
Constant -0.670 -3.023*** -2.828 -4.796** 
 (1.091) (1.173) (2.036) (2.282) 
     
Observations 3,946 3,946 3,946 3,946 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
coefficients are estimated using survey weighted data (Stata’s svy prefix). Reference category: No need for a loan. 
 
Similarly, the results show that managers of older firms, firms holding an 
internationally-recognized quality certification, and firms with higher exports share of sales, 
are more confident and significantly less likely to engage in a self-selection behavior in general, 
both in Africa and North Africa. Also, managers of firms located in larger cities are less 
confident as they face fiercer competition in the credit market, and thus are significantly more 
likely to engage in a self-selection behavior. Unexpectedly, we observe that firms whose 
financial statements are checked and certified by an external auditor, supposedly reducing 
information asymmetries (between firms and banks) that increase risk to lenders and constrain 
the supply of finance, tend to adopt a self-selection behavior in both Africa and North Africa 
(Tables 3 and 4). 
5.2. Instrumental Variable Estimates  
Although the results from our baseline specification show strong self-selection of female-
managers out of the credit market, the estimates are suspected to be biased due to endogeneity.  
We use an IV probit specification to correct for the potential endogeneity. Tables 5 and 6 depict 
the results for the whole Africa sample and the North Africa region subsample, respectively. 
We report the results for all firms and the subsamples of micro firms (less than 5 employees) 
and small-size firms (5-19 employees)8. From the first-stage F-statistic for the instrument’s 
significance and statistically significant coefficient of the proportion of female employees, we 
confirm the statistical plausibility of our instrument9 (see Tables 5 and 6; columns 2, 4, and 6). 
The J-test of overidentifying restrictions further supports the validity of our instrument, as the 
                                                 
8
 We could not report the results of medium- (20-99 employees) and large-size (100+ employees) firms due to 
small sample sizes.  
9
 As a rule of thumb, the F-statistic for (joint) significance of the instrument(s) in the first stage should exceed 10. 
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statistically insignificant J-test statistic implies that we do not reject the null hypothesis of 
instrument exogeneity (see Tables 5 and 6; columns 1, 3, and 5). 
As shown in Table 5 (column 1), after correcting for potential endogeneity, the 
coefficient on female top manager for the whole sample of firms in Africa becomes 
insignificant. However, when we restrict our sample to micro and small-size firms (see 
columns 3 and 5, respectively), we find evidence that women managers significantly self-select 
out of the credit market because of their low perception of their creditworthiness, compared to 
men. This finding can be explained by the fact that, in light of asymmetric and imperfect 
information in the credit market, smaller firms tend to have less information about their true 
creditworthiness, as they usually lack the expertise to assess their creditworthiness through 
reliable financial reports and, importantly, to obtain information on the creditworthiness of the 
pool of applicants in the credit market, leading to a perception bias. This combined with the 
fact that women are more risk averse than men in financial decision-making10, probably lead 
women managers of smaller firms to generate even lower perception of their creditworthiness. 
Besides the gender of top manager, self-selection out of the credit market in Africa is 
significantly determined by factors such as the age of the firm, holding an internationally-
recognized quality certification, and firm’s export orientation. 
Table 5: IV Estimates of Self-Selection due to Low Perceived Creditworthiness  
(by Gender of Top Manager in Africa and Firm Size) 
Variables  All Firms  Small Firms  Micro Firms 
  (1) 
Low 
Perception  
(2) 
First-
Stage 
 (3) 
Low 
Perception  
(4) 
First-
Stage 
 (5) 
Low 
Perception 
(6) 
First-
Stage 
Female Top Manager Y:1 N:0  1.449   1.750**   1.547*  
 (1.052)   (0.840)   (0.916)  
Sales Per Worker  -0.051*   -0.037   -0.040  
  (0.032)   (0.035)   (0.052)  
Proportion of Female Employees   0.236***   0.333***   0.363*** 
  (0.056)   (0.064)   (0.082) 
Proportion of Female Employees 
(Missing) 
  -0.019   -0.025   -0.001 
  (0.019)   (0.028)   (0.039) 
Constant  -2.818*** 0.310***  -3.406*** 0.384***  -1.290 0.241* 
  (0.703) (0.105)  (0.735) (0.136)  (0.856) (0.130) 
          
F-Stat (IVs Joint Significance)   18.22   27.15   20.53 
J-Stat (Overidentification)  1.01   1.32   0.79  
Observations  11,603 11,603  6,457 6,457  3,641 3,641 
With Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
coefficients are estimated using survey weighted data (Stata’s svy prefix). Country dummies are included in all estimations. 
                                                 
10
 There is a lot of evidence that women are more risk averse than men in financial decision-making (see e.g., 
Parrotta and Smith, 2013; Charness and Gneezy, 2012; Borghans et al., 2009). 
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Women self-selection due to low perceived creditworthiness is far stronger for firms in 
North Africa regardless of the sample size and firm true creditworthiness (Table 6). One 
possible explanation is the lower marketing and financial literacy of women entrepreneurs in 
the region compared to men, making it harder for women to assess their true creditworthiness. 
According to S&P Global FinLit Survey, the gender gap in financial literacy ranges from 5 
percent in Egypt to 9 percent in Mauritania, 10 percent in Algeria, and 13 percent in Tunisia. 
Another explanation is the difficulties faced by women entrepreneurs in the region in 
presenting their investment projects to bankers or investors. Moreover, women may lack the 
confidence in dealing with authorities and financial institutions and, therefore, find it difficult 
to convincingly convey their business proposals (OECD, 2011). Besides, the gender of top 
manager, we find significant evidence that self-selection out of the credit market in North 
Africa is determined by factors such as the size of locality and the age of the firm (Table 6). 
Table 6: IV Estimates of Self-Selection due to Low Perceived Creditworthiness  
(by Gender of Top Manager in North Africa and Firm Size) 
  All Firms  Small Firms  Micro Firms 
  (1) 
Low 
Perception  
(2) 
First-
Stage 
 (3) 
Low 
Perception 
(4) 
First-
Stage 
 (5) 
Low 
Perception 
(6) 
First-
Stage 
Female Top Manager Y:1 N:0  2.844***   3.006***   2.832**  
  (0.994)   (0.965)   (1.151)  
Sales Per Worker  -0.045   -0.038   -0.072  
  (0.045)   (0.052)   (0.080)  
Proportion of Female Employees   0.179**   0.258***   0.356** 
   (0.074)   (0.096)   (0.141) 
Proportion of Female Employees 
(Missing) 
  -0.023   -0.034   -0.018 
  (0.022)   (0.034)   (0.050) 
Constant  -1.851** 0.212**  -1.353* 0.090  -0.243 0.083 
  (0.773) (0.092)  (0.695) (0.087)  (1.004) (0.137) 
          
J-Stat (Overidentification)  0.51   0.13   0.31  
Observations  3,916 3,916  1,628 1,628  843 843 
With Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
coefficients are estimated using survey weighted data (Stata’s svy prefix). Country dummies are included in all estimations. 
 
Our results provide evidence that the size of the firm is not a key driver of women’s 
self-selection out of the credit market, both in Africa and North Africa. 
5.3. Discrimination in the Credit Market 
In addition to perception about creditworthiness, self-selection out of the credit market could 
be driven by present discriminatory lending practices against women by the banks. In order to 
rule out discrimination by banks as a possible driver for women’s self-selection behavior, we 
20 
 
estimate whether firms with female manager face higher rejection rate on their applications for 
new loans or new lines of credit, compared to their male counterparts.  
Table 7 presents the results for the whole sample of Africa and firms in North Africa. 
After controlling for confounding factors, the results show no statistically significant evidence 
that female-managed firms in Africa and North Africa have a higher probability of rejection 
than men-managed firms. That is, we find no statistical evidence of credit market 
discrimination against female entrepreneurs both in Africa and North Africa. This strengthens 
our argument that female entrepreneurs self-select out of the credit market due to their low 
perceived creditworthiness. 
Table 7: Logit Estimates of Loan / Credit Line Application Outcomes  
(by Gender of Top Manager) 
Outcome Variable: What Was the Outcome of the 
Most Recent Application for Loan / Credit Line? 
Rejected:1 Approved:0 
 Logistic regression 
 (1) 
Africa 
(2) 
North Africa 
Female Top Manager Y:1 N:0  -0.948 -0.986 
  (0.631) (1.111) 
Sector (Ref: Manufacturing)    
Services  0.091 0.218 
  (0.382) (0.593) 
Firm Size (Ref: Small)    
Medium  0.175 0.774 
  (0.398) (0.676) 
Large  -1.082** -0.653 
  (0.480) (0.710) 
Locality Size (Ref: Main Business City)    
Over 1 million  0.741 2.119* 
  (0.684) (1.238) 
250,000 - 1 million  -0.124 0.838 
  (0.651) (1.195) 
50,000 - 250,000  1.661* 3.759*** 
  (0.862) (1.346) 
Less than 50,000  1.488* 3.053** 
  (0.811) (1.279) 
Official Capital City Y:1 N:0  1.079** 2.797** 
  (0.477) (1.115) 
Firm Legal Status (Ref: Shareholding Company 
with Shares Traded in the Stock Market) 
   
Shareholding Company with Non-
Traded/Privately-Traded Shares 
 0.099 -0.138 
  (0.567) (0.754) 
Sole Proprietorship   -0.582 -0.626 
  (0.525) (0.765) 
Partnership  -1.098 -0.869 
  (0.822) (1.177) 
Limited partnership  -0.033 0.030 
  (0.610) (0.881) 
Other  -0.191 0.685 
  (0.891) (1.447) 
Share Foreign Ownership  0.009* 0.010 
  (0.004) (0.007) 
Firm Age  -0.041*** -0.077*** 
  (0.015) (0.023) 
Number of Employees  -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Top Manager Experience Years  0.010 0.025 
  (0.016) (0.025) 
Quality Certification Y:1 N:0  -0.135 -0.100 
  (0.514) (0.789) 
Sales Per Worker  -0.576*** -0.530*** 
21 
 
  (0.126) (0.192) 
Direct Exports Share of Sales  0.004 0.002 
  (0.006) (0.008) 
External Audit Y:1 N:0  -1.149*** -0.954* 
  (0.368) (0.521) 
Constant  6.542*** 4.363 
  (1.918) (2.832) 
    
Observations  2,253 577 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. All coefficients are estimated using survey weighted data (Stata’s svy prefix). 
Country dummies are included in all estimations. 
 
Overall, application rejection rates are significantly driven by systematic characteristics 
such as firm size, locality size, whether the firm is in a capital city, firm age, and whether the 
firm’s financial statements are checked and certified by an external auditor. Also, as expected, 
we observe a significant negative association between productivity and the probability of a 
firm’s application being rejected. This result suggests that firm’s productivity is an important 
indicator used by banks to assess the creditworthiness of firms, supporting our simplifying 
assumption in the conceptual framework that banks’ prediction of creditworthiness is unbiased 
and coalesce towards the objective creditworthiness of applicants.  
6. Conclusion 
Access to finance is a key constraint for entrepreneurs in Africa, and empirical evidence shows 
that women entrepreneurs are particularly disadvantaged. Although supply-side factors that 
limit women’s access to finance have been extensively addressed in the literature, little is 
documented about demand-side factors, in particular, self-selectivity behavior. Within a 
parsimonious theoretical model of credit market with an imperfect information regime, we 
provide fresh evidence that compared to men, women entrepreneurs are more likely to self-
select themselves out of the formal credit market based on their perceived creditworthiness. 
Women managers of micro- and small-size firms in Africa are found to be more likely to self-
select out of the credit market compared to men. Regardless of firm size, we also find stronger 
self-selectivity behavior in the region of North Africa. 
Moreover, we show that there is no systematic bias in loan rejection rates against 
women entrepreneurs and establish that the observed self-exclusion behavior from the part of 
women loan applicants is mainly due to their low perceived creditworthiness. This holds even 
if the results show that banks assess them favorably. Thus, the observed self-selection behavior 
is not a response mechanism to current discriminatory lending practices by financial 
institutions, but could be driven by, for instance, lower levels of risk tolerance by women than 
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men. If this is the case, then low overall financial literacy among women together with poor 
communication between financial institutions and women entrepreneurs can induce 
uninformed decisions about accessing finance. 
The findings of this paper have substantial policy implications to address the gender 
gap in access to finance. Besides supply-side factors, there is need to address demand-side 
factors, such as the financial literacy of women entrepreneurs. Financially-literate 
entrepreneurs are found to make more informed financial decisions and assess their 
creditworthiness more objectively. This is especially important as the complexity of credit 
markets increases. Thus, enabling women entrepreneurs with the appropriate financial 
knowledge and skills will ensure their effective engagement in the credit market.  
Equally important is to realize that, besides financial knowledge, gender differences 
extend to financial behavior. Women, for instance, are more likely than men to save informally. 
Thus, one way to foster women’s demand for financial services is to introduce financial 
products aimed at meeting the needs of borrowers who traditionally use informal systems of 
finance. An example of such products is loans for which smaller and more mobile assets—and 
traditional wealth-storage mediums such as livestock or gold—are accepted as collateral. 
Governments can also assist in the development of new products—for example, by putting in 
place the necessary legal and fiscal framework. 
Our study raises several opportunities for future research, especially regarding the 
causal pathways that underlie the observed gender differential in perceived creditworthiness, 
which drives women’s self-selection behavior. As we control for differences between men and 
women entrepreneurs in terms of talents, and their respective firms in terms of characteristics; 
and as we rule out that the observed self-selection behavior is driven by discrimination on the 
supply side of the credit market, or generally institutional barriers; we are left with an 
interesting causal pathway that requires further investigation: men and women tend to behave 
differently. These behavioral differences can be based, for instance, on differences in risk, 
social and competitive preferences, which deserves further investigation. 
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics and Estimation Results by Gender of Firm’s Owner 
Table A.1: Reasons for not Applying for New Loans/Lines of Credit in the Last Fiscal Year 
(by Gender of Principal/Majority Owner*) 
Reason  Africa  North Africa 
  Male Female Pooled  Male Female Pooled 
No need for a loan**  67.2% 51.5% 62.8%  75.4% 75.6% 75.3% 
Application procedures were complex  9.9% 10.2% 10.4%  9.0% 6.3% 8.8% 
Interest rates were not favorable  8.2% 13.1% 10.9%  6.0% 11.0% 6.4% 
Collateral requirements were too high  5.4% 9.6% 5.8%  2.1% 0.8% 2.1% 
Size of loan and maturity were insufficient  1.0% 3.0% 1.2%  0.7% 0.0% 0.7% 
Did not think it would be approved (Low 
Perceived Creditworthiness) 
 3.7% 3.0% 4.1%  3.6% 2.8% 3.6% 
Other reasons  4.6% 9.7% 4.7%  3.1% 3.6% 3.1% 
         
Observations    37,699    6,097 
* Each firm is categorized as men-owned, majorly men-owned, majorly women-owned, women-owned, and 
equally owned. Equally men- and women-owned firms report 50-percent male ownership and 50-percent female 
ownership; these firms represent less than 5 percent of our sample and are excluded from all ownership 
calculations. Survey weighted data are used (Stata’s svy prefix). ** Establishment had sufficient capital.  
 
Table A.2: Differences in Firm Baseline Characteristics  
(by Gender of Principal/Majority Owner) 
Characteristic  Africa  North Africa 
  Male Female Pooled  Male Female Pooled 
Sector         
Manufacturing  48.2% 39.4% 47.3%  64.2% 65.2% 64.2% 
Services  51.8% 60.6% 52.7%  35.8% 34.8% 35.8% 
Firm Size         
Small  55.1% 72.8% 56.8%  41.3% 52.8% 41.6% 
Medium  30.4% 21.7% 29.5%  35.2% 33.2% 35.2% 
Large  14.6% 5.6% 13.7%  23.5% 14.0% 23.2% 
Locality Size         
Main Business City  19.6% 12.4% 18.8%  34.5% 31.5% 34.4% 
Over 1 million  39.5% 47.9% 40.3%  17.1% 12.9% 17.0% 
250,000 – 1 million  25.9% 26.0% 25.9%  20.3% 22.5% 20.4% 
50,000 – 250,000  10.7% 10.8% 10.7%  15.7% 20.8% 15.9% 
Less than 50,000  4.5% 2.9% 4.3%  12.4% 12.4% 12.4% 
Official Capital City Y:1  40.8% 45.0% 41.2%  26.5% 23.0% 26.3% 
Firm Legal Status         
Shareholding Company with Shares 
Traded in the Stock Market 
 5.8% 1.7% 5.3%  7.0% 5.1% 7.0% 
Shareholding Company with Non-
Traded/Privately-Traded Shares 
 17.2% 6.9% 16.1%  28.5% 20.8% 28.3% 
Sole Proprietorship   52.0% 77.5% 54.5%  33.4% 51.1% 34.0% 
Partnership  12.1% 5.7% 11.4%  19.3% 15.2% 19.2% 
Limited partnership  10.9% 6.9% 10.5%  10.5% 6.2% 10.3% 
Other  2.2% 1.3% 2.1%  1.3% 1.7% 1.3% 
Share Foreign Ownership  11.791 6.047 11.594  6.252 5.423 6.492 
Firm Age  16.894 14.373 15.875  20.900 18.565 20.645 
Number of Employees  72.796 57.763 65.506  128.771 71.723 132.212 
Top Manager Experience Years  16.716 13.888 15.197  21.899 19.080 21.425 
Quality Certification Y:1  16.1% 8.9% 15.4%  22.9% 14.4% 22.6% 
Sales Per Worker  10.323 9.677 10.490  10.890 10.530 10.887 
Direct Exports Share of Sales  5.784 4.739 4.823  8.911 12.126 8.999 
External Audit Y:1  55.2% 41.9% 53.9%  77.2% 72.2% 77.0% 
         
Observations    37,699    6,097 
For continuous variables (share foreign ownership, firm age, number of employees, top manager experience years, ln sales per worker and 
direct exports share of sales), we report means instead of proportions. 
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Table A.3: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Self-Selection out of the Credit Market  
(by Gender of Principal/Majority Owner in Africa) 
Outcome Variable: What is the Main Reason for not 
Applying for New Loans / New Lines of Credit? 
Reason 
(1) 
Complex 
Application 
(2) 
Unfavorable   
Terms 
(3) 
Low 
Perception 
(4) 
Other Reasons 
Female Principal/Majority Owner Y:1 N:0 -0.393 0.101 -0.200 -0.137 
 (0.431) (0.259) (0.459) (0.364) 
Sector (Ref: Manufacturing)     
Services -0.217 -0.260 -0.041 -0.145 
 (0.208) (0.161) (0.320) (0.273) 
Firm Size (Ref: Small)     
Medium -0.418* -0.473** 0.001 -0.175 
 (0.235) (0.196) (0.366) (0.338) 
Large -0.330 -1.260*** -0.437 -0.085 
 (0.364) (0.298) (0.382) (0.435) 
Locality Size (Ref: Main Business City)     
Over 1 million -0.449 0.414 1.041** 1.172** 
 (0.346) (0.278) (0.500) (0.504) 
250,000 - 1 million -0.004 0.774** 0.993** 1.144** 
 (0.396) (0.316) (0.453) (0.485) 
50,000 - 250,000 0.059 0.918*** 2.141*** 1.251** 
 (0.431) (0.321) (0.547) (0.523) 
Less than 50,000 0.076 1.053*** 0.474 0.164 
 (0.479) (0.361) (0.504) (0.648) 
Official Capital City Y:1 N:0 -0.437 0.268 0.013 -0.154 
 (0.310) (0.192) (0.322) (0.308) 
Firm Legal Status (Ref: Shareholding Company with 
Shares Traded in the Stock Market) 
    
Shareholding Company with Non-
Traded/Privately-Traded Shares 
-0.801 0.140 -0.192 -1.155* 
 (0.495) (0.402) (1.051) (0.610) 
Sole Proprietorship  -0.254 0.246 0.005 0.268 
 (0.448) (0.340) (0.956) (0.536) 
Partnership -0.057 0.732** -0.403 -0.493 
 (0.465) (0.371) (1.039) (0.575) 
Limited partnership 0.116 0.414 0.819 -0.345 
 (0.497) (0.366) (1.045) (0.649) 
Other -1.960** -1.468** -2.797** -1.254 
 (0.802) (0.694) (1.187) (0.848) 
Share Foreign Ownership -0.009** 0.003 0.000 -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Firm Age -0.004 -0.003 -0.082*** -0.044*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.018) (0.015) 
Number of Employees 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Top Manager Experience Years -0.008 0.008 0.008 0.021* 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.015) (0.012) 
Quality Certification Y:1 N:0 -0.094 -0.098 -1.319*** -0.451 
 (0.363) (0.229) (0.409) (0.381) 
Sales Per Worker -0.038 -0.079 -0.146** 0.039 
 (0.058) (0.050) (0.066) (0.084) 
Direct Exports Share of Sales -0.005 -0.010* -0.014** -0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
External Audit Y:1 N:0 -0.434** -0.162 0.658** 0.744*** 
 (0.208) (0.158) (0.322) (0.257) 
Constant -0.937 0.159 -3.173** -2.083 
 (0.923) (0.841) (1.487) (1.359) 
     
Observations 10,603 10,603 10,603 10,603 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
coefficients are estimated using survey weighted data (Stata’s svy prefix). Country dummies are included in all estimations. Reference 
category: No need for a loan. 
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Table A.4: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Self-Selection  
(by Gender of Principal/Majority Owner in North Africa) 
Outcome Variable: What is the Main Reason for not 
Applying for New Loans / New Lines of Credit? 
Reason 
(1) 
Complex 
Application 
(2) 
Unfavorable   
Terms 
(3) 
Low 
Perception  
(4) 
Other Reasons 
Female Principal/Majority Owner Y:1 N:0 -0.418 0.460 -0.018 -3.830*** 
 (0.791) (0.628) (0.868) (0.755) 
Sector (Ref: Manufacturing)     
Services -0.157 -0.328 0.033 -0.040 
 (0.249) (0.233) (0.387) (0.408) 
Firm Size (Ref: Small)     
Medium -0.492* -0.339 0.122 -0.399 
 (0.277) (0.269) (0.436) (0.502) 
Large -0.578 -1.259*** -0.062 0.384 
 (0.422) (0.454) (0.533) (0.731) 
Locality Size (Ref: Main Business City)     
Over 1 million -0.748* 0.682 1.128 2.074** 
 (0.427) (0.474) (0.694) (1.008) 
250,000 - 1 million -0.120 1.110** 0.860 2.016** 
 (0.414) (0.460) (0.664) (0.993) 
50,000 - 250,000 -0.002 1.254*** 2.370*** 2.362** 
 (0.459) (0.468) (0.662) (1.017) 
Less than 50,000 -0.042 1.364*** 0.566 1.028 
 (0.496) (0.497) (0.659) (1.112) 
Official Capital City Y:1 N:0 -0.680* 0.603 0.212 1.139 
 (0.384) (0.425) (0.635) (1.032) 
Firm Legal Status (Ref: Shareholding Company with 
Shares Traded in the Stock Market) 
    
Shareholding Company with Non-
Traded/Privately-Traded Shares 
-0.964* 0.297 -0.957 -2.159** 
 (0.581) (0.573) (1.213) (0.938) 
Sole Proprietorship  -0.256 0.297 -0.590 -0.205 
 (0.513) (0.529) (1.098) (0.753) 
Partnership -0.095 0.906* -1.083 -1.351* 
 (0.525) (0.529) (1.206) (0.788) 
Limited partnership 0.024 0.361 0.069 -1.078 
 (0.567) (0.570) (1.173) (0.886) 
Other -2.942** -0.260 -14.752*** -1.811 
 (1.386) (0.971) (1.269) (1.223) 
Share Foreign Ownership -0.010* 0.006 0.003 -0.016** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Firm Age -0.003 0.001 -0.118*** -0.083*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.026) (0.030) 
Number of Employees 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Top Manager Experience Years -0.006 0.010 0.012 0.037** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.017) 
Quality Certification Y:1 N:0 -0.002 -0.230 -1.579*** -0.464 
 (0.452) (0.351) (0.530) (0.735) 
Sales Per Worker -0.015 0.030 -0.179* -0.071 
 (0.084) (0.101) (0.102) (0.164) 
Direct Exports Share of Sales -0.006 -0.005 -0.018** -0.019* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
External Audit Y:1 N:0 -0.408* -0.264 1.110** 1.190*** 
 (0.241) (0.232) (0.501) (0.447) 
Country (Ref: Egypt)     
Mauritania 0.365 1.669** 0.654 1.156 
 (0.813) (0.661) (1.253) (1.190) 
Morocco -1.025** -0.536 -0.710 -0.496 
 (0.496) (0.414) (0.916) (0.624) 
Tunisia 0.784** 0.706* 1.960*** 1.043 
 (0.396) (0.382) (0.584) (0.705) 
Constant -0.495 -3.507*** -1.253 -3.723* 
 (1.121) (1.273) (1.743) (2.081) 
     
Observations 3,775 3,775 3,775 3,775 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
coefficients are estimated using survey weighted data (Stata’s svy prefix). Reference category: No need for a loan. 
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Table A.5: IV Estimates of Self-Selection due to Low Perceived Creditworthiness  
(by Gender of Principal/Majority Owner in Africa and Firm Size) 
Variables  All Firms  Small Firms  Micro Firms 
  (1) 
Low 
Perception 
(2) 
First-Stage 
 (3) 
Low 
Perception 
(4) 
First-Stage 
 (5) 
Low 
Perception 
(6) 
First-Stage 
Female Principal/Majority 
Owner Y:1 N:0 
 2.485*   2.866***   2.444**  
 (1.518)   (1.026)   (1.170)  
Sales Per Worker  -0.040   -0.043   -0.062  
  (0.030)   (0.028)   (0.041)  
Proportion of Female 
Employees 
  0.117***   0.167***   0.206*** 
   (0.036)   (0.046)   (0.056) 
Proportion of Female 
Employees (Missing) 
  0.009   -0.006   -0.022 
  (0.013)   (0.014)   (0.019) 
Constant  -2.609*** 0.287***  -2.880*** 0.286**  -1.626** 0.277** 
  (0.573) (0.094)  (0.617) (0.126)  (0.666) (0.111) 
          
F-Stat (IVs Joint 
Significance) 
  10.53   13.66   15.09 
Observations  10,603 10,603  6,009 6,009  3,421 3,421 
With Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
coefficients are estimated using survey weighted data (Stata’s svy prefix). Country dummies are included in all estimations. 
 
Table A.6: IV Estimates of Self-Selection due to Low Perceived Creditworthiness  
(by Gender of Principal/Majority Owner in North Africa and Firm Size) 
Variables  All Firms  Small Firms  Micro Firms 
  (1) 
Low 
Perception 
(2) 
First-Stage 
 (3) 
Low 
Perception 
(4) 
First-Stage 
 (5) 
Low 
Perception 
(6) 
First-Stage 
Female Principal/Majority 
Owner Y:1 N:0 
 4.573***   4.200***   4.604***  
 (1.773)   (1.554)   (1.364)  
Proportion of Female 
Employees 
  0.074   0.139*   0.161* 
   (0.050)   (0.072)   (0.096) 
Proportion of Female 
Employees (Missing) 
  0.004   -0.007   -0.029* 
  (0.011)   (0.017)   (0.016) 
Constant  -1.803*** 0.118**  -1.398*** 0.055  -0.328 0.057 
  (0.500) (0.048)  (0.485) (0.037)  (0.462) (0.052) 
          
Observations  4,267 4,267  1,816 1,816  943 943 
With Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
coefficients are estimated using survey weighted data (Stata’s svy prefix). Country dummies are included in all estimations. The p-value 
associated with the “Proportion of Female Employees” in the “All Firms” estimation equals 0.141. The removal of “Sales Per Worker” 
corresponded to a significant increase in the validity of the instrumental variable “Proportion of Female Employees”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
Table A.7: Logit Estimates of Loan / Credit Line Application Outcomes  
(by Gender of Principal/Majority Owner) 
Outcome Variable: What Was the Outcome of 
the Most Recent Application for Loan / Credit 
Line? Rejected:1 Approved:0 
 Logistic Regression 
 (1) 
Africa 
(2) 
North Africa 
Principal/Majority Owner Y:1 N:0  -0.986* -1.889 
  (0.527) (1.375) 
Sector (Ref: Manufacturing)    
Services  -0.064 -0.120 
  (0.391) (0.595) 
Firm Size (Ref: Small)    
Medium  0.238 0.709 
  (0.445) (0.733) 
Large  -0.844* -0.405 
  (0.471) (0.706) 
Locality Size (Ref: Main Business City)    
Over 1 million  1.312* 2.641** 
  (0.720) (1.168) 
250,000 - 1 million  0.453 1.463 
  (0.712) (1.197) 
50,000 - 250,000  2.860*** 4.840*** 
  (0.935) (1.421) 
Less than 50,000  2.164** 3.654*** 
  (0.891) (1.390) 
Official Capital City Y:1 N:0  1.370** 2.750** 
  (0.573) (1.176) 
Firm Legal Status (Ref: Shareholding Company 
with Shares Traded in the Stock Market) 
   
Shareholding Company with Non-
Traded/Privately-Traded Shares 
 -0.282 -0.366 
(0.639) (0.780) 
Sole Proprietorship   -0.804 -1.189 
  (0.576) (0.854) 
Partnership  -0.524 -0.360 
  (0.746) (1.050) 
Limited partnership  -0.222 -0.291 
  (0.642) (0.848) 
Other  -0.306 0.346 
  (0.975) (1.575) 
Share Foreign Ownership  0.007 0.009 
  (0.005) (0.007) 
Firm Age  -0.012 -0.032 
  (0.015) (0.020) 
Number of Employees  -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.001) 
Top Manager Experience Years  -0.007 -0.002 
  (0.019) (0.029) 
Quality Certification Y:1 N:0  -0.665 -0.946 
  (0.585) (0.903) 
Sales Per Worker  -0.511*** -0.420** 
  (0.125) (0.173) 
Direct Exports Share of Sales  0.005 0.002 
  (0.006) (0.008) 
External Audit Y:1 N:0  -1.084*** -0.824 
  (0.409) (0.561) 
Constant  4.741** 3.182 
  (2.100) (2.782) 
    
Observations  1,982 546 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. All coefficients are estimated using survey weighted data (Stata’s svy 
prefix). Country dummies are included in all estimations. 
 
 
